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Abstract
As the discovery of wrongful convictions grows, so does concern in the legal community and public 
sphere about actual innocence. Though research on miscarriages of justice has grown tremendously, 
most has focused on the factors contributing to wrongful convictions, with relatively little attention 
paid to the post-release struggles of exonerees. Specifically, social scientists have not yet examined 
policies designed to assist the exonerated in their return to society. This study provides a content 
analysis of existing compensation statutes for the wrongly convicted. Results show that just more 
than half of American states have compensation statutes for exonerees, and the assistance offered 
varies tremendously from state to state. Assessing current statutes in comparison to a model 
standard indicates that whereas some jurisdictions provide fairly comprehensive packages, others 
offer little in the way of reentry assistance. The importance of such statutes and implications for the 
wrongly convicted are discussed.
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Research on the subject has increased, and knowledge about these cases of injustice 
has affected the perceptions of our criminal justice system among both the public and 
legal community (Garrett, 2008).
Policies to right these wrongs, however, have not kept pace. Though some states 
have implemented reforms designed to reduce the number of wrongful convictions, 
increase the discovery of mistaken verdicts, and remedy the situation as best as pos-
sible, others have not acted.1 Even with protective reforms in place, it seems inevitable 
that at least some innocent defendants will be convicted. The victims of these miscar-
riages of justice often desire compensation. Indeed, Campbell and Denov (2004) dis-
cuss the feelings of security and comfort that state-provided support may bring for 
exonerees, who acknowledge that although monetary and other reentry assistance can-
not return life to what it was pre-wrongful conviction, it can provide some peace of 
mind. Many exonerees, however, have been unable to obtain such support. Of the first 
250 individuals exonerated through DNA testing, approximately 40% have not received 
compensation (Innocence Project, 2009).
The lack of reentry assistance provided may be due in part to shortcomings in the 
existing statutory remedies for the wrongly convicted. The policies which make avail-
able such reintegration services, however, have generally not been studied by social 
scientists, and a full understanding of their strengths and weaknesses has yet to be 
developed. Though several legal scholars and advocacy groups have discussed the 
issue (e.g., Bernhard, 1999, 2009; Innocence Project, 2009), more methodical analysis 
is needed to understand the complexities of current policies. In this article, I begin to 
fill this void in the literature by providing an assessment of existing compensation 
statutes for the wrongly convicted in comparison to a model policy. First, I survey the 
national landscape to determine which states have compensation statutes in place and 
provide a detailed content analysis of existing statutes. I then assess the policies in 
relation to the model legislation offered by the Innocence Project, a large nonprofit 
organization based out of the Cardozo Law School, which works to secure postconvic-
tion DNA testing for inmates who claim factual innocence. This type of policy analy-
sis can highlight the importance exoneration-compensation statutes and the limitations 
of those that do exist, providing a foundation on which to develop new policies and 
reforms to strengthen existing ones.
Methods of Compensation
Exonerees may obtain compensation in several different ways, including private 
bills, litigation, and compensation statutes. The first option allows a wrongly con-
victed individual to attempt to obtain a private compensation bill from the state leg-
islature, the success rate for which is very low (Bernhard, 1999; Lonergan, 2008). 
Only 9% of Innocence Project exonerees have received compensation through private 
bills. Similarly, exonerees attempting to obtain compensation through litigation, via 
either tort law or civil rights doctrine, face a daunting task. Lawsuits are extremely 
difficult to win given the high burdens of proof required and the immunity protections 
Over the past 20 years, awareness of wrongful convictions has grown tremendously. 
Since 1989, there have been more than 300 exonerations of the wrongly convicted 
(Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, & Patil, 2005), including more than 265 
through DNA testing (Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org), and 138 
in capital cases (Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org). 
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of state actors, namely police and prosecutors (Bernhard, 1999, 2009). Even when 
litigation is possible, it can prove to be too costly and time-consuming for exonerees 
facing the hardships of release and reentry. As Bernhard (2009) points out, though 
several exonerees have won large civil awards, the vast majority have not. Only 28% 
of Innocence Project exonerees have received compensation through civil suits, and 
those individuals waited an average of almost 4 years to receive their awards (Innocence 
Project, 2009).
Given the difficulties of receiving compensation through litigation or private bills, 
scholars have argued for the creation of statutes to compensate the wrongfully con-
victed and provide other reintegration assistance. Of the DNA exonerees who have 
received compensation, approximately 33% were awarded through state statutes 
(Innocence Project, 2009). Bernhard (1999, 2009) categorizes compensation statutes 
along with crime victims’ assistance legislation, arguing that such statutes provide the 
easiest, fairest, and most consistent method of compensating the wrongly convicted.
In addition to scholars, several legal organizations also have advocated for compen-
sation statutes. The American Bar Association urges jurisdictions to fairly compensate 
individuals based on the amount of time served, including noneconomic losses and 
assistance in reentering the community (American Bar Association Section on Criminal 
Justice, 2005). The Innocence Project offers perhaps the most complete exemplar for 
compensating the wrongfully convicted (Innocence Project, 2009). Their recommen-
dations include a set yearly amount of monetary compensation (at least US$50,000), 
with additional amounts for time spent on death row, on parole, or as a registered sex 
offender. In addition, they suggest a range of other assistance, including reintegrative 
services, educational credits, and job-skill training.
Some jurisdictions have responded and adopted compensation statutes for exoner-
ees, and legal scholars have provided descriptions and critiques of particular policies, 
but they have been neither comprehensive nor systematic. Bernhard (1999, 2009) 
points out that some existing statutes vary widely and are far from perfect. Among their 
weaknesses are the sometimes-strict eligibility requirements (e.g., requiring exonerees 
to obtain a full pardon), high standards of proof, limited awards, numerous disquali-
fiers, and short time limits. These sentiments are echoed by Lonergan (2008), who in 
addition addresses the lack of nonmonetary services (e.g., mental and physical health 
care, education assistance) present in many existing statutes.
Experts typically call for comprehensive reentry assistance, and statutory compen-
sation can provide such support, helping exonerees to overcome many of the hurdles 
they face on release. In the following section, I describe some of these struggles, 
adopting the framework of exonerees as victims of state harm (Westervelt & Cook, 
2010). This framework builds on the traditional victimology of state-harms (see 
Kauzlarich, Matthews, & Miller, 2001) by highlighting the role of the state in creating 
and exacerbating the problems faced by the wrongly convicted. The state-harms 
framework provides a valuable model for understanding the post-release hardships 
faced by exonerees. Such awareness of post-release issues provides a better apprecia-
tion for the importance of adequate compensation and reentry assistance.
Post-release Struggles of the Wrongfully Convicted
On release, exonerees must deal with a wide range of issues that impact themselves 
and those around them. Nearly all experience financial hardships, often lacking the 
transitional funds for necessities such as housing (Innocence Project, 2009; Westervelt 
& Cook, 2010). Some exonerees have reported the embarrassment of having to rely on 
family members or friends for assistance. For example, Herman Atkins, Sr., an exoneree 
from California who served more than 11 years in prison, stated, “At the age of 34, 
I had to go back to my parents as if I was a child and say, ‘Mama, or daddy, I need this, 
that, and the other’” (Innocence Project Video, 2010).
The post-release struggles of the exonerated are not restricted solely to monetary 
woes. Research shows that years of wrongful imprisonment can have long-lasting 
ramifications (Grounds, 2004). The wrongly convicted often must deal with long-term 
personality change, posttraumatic stress and other psychiatric disorders, and the dif-
ficulties of coping with stigma, grief, and loss. Families often have changed dramati-
cally by the time of release, and exonerees are forced to negotiate conflicting feelings 
of bitterness, depression, and social rejection (Campbell & Denov, 2004; Grounds, 
2004; Westervelt & Cook, 2008, 2010). Some family members, as well as other com-
munity members, continue to believe in the exoneree’s guilt, refusing to accept that 
the person was wrongly convicted.
Physical health problems also are common among exonerees, often due to substan-
dard prison health care. Common ailments include malnutrition, muscular atrophy, 
asthma, skin rashes, and premature aging (Innocence Project, 2009; Westervelt & 
Cook, 2010). Furthermore, once released, exonerees may have difficulty obtaining 
health care, which is often determined by employment, another barrier for the wrongly 
convicted (Westervelt & Cook, 2010). Exonerees often lack the educational training 
and job-skills necessary to build successful careers on release (Campbell & Denov, 
2004; Grounds, 2004; Westervelt & Cook, 2008, 2010). In fact, Westervelt and Cook 
(2010) found employment troubles to be the most frequently cited difficulty faced by 
exonerees.
Like other institutionalized individuals, exonerees report struggling with the practi-
cal skills involved in everyday life, such as grocery shopping and sleeping. Years of a 
tightly controlled, regimented lifestyle lead to difficulties of adaptation on release 
(Grounds, 2004; Westervelt & Cook, 2010). They may struggle to adjust to a world 
that is vastly different from the one they knew before imprisonment. Technological 
struggles are paramount for exonerees, some of whom had never seen a computer or 
cell phone (Innocence Project, 2009; Westervelt & Cook, 2010). Calvin Johnson, Jr., 
a Georgia exoneree, summarizes the feeling well, reporting that he felt like a “baby in 
a brand new world” upon his release (Innocence Project Video, 2010).
The post-exoneration struggles of the wrongly convicted are similar in many 
respects to those faced by all parolees. Exonerees’ situations, however, are unique. 
Campbell and Denov (2004) argue that the post-release experiences of the wrongly con-
victed differ from those of ordinary parolees in two distinct ways. First, many exonerees 
demonstrate “an increased intolerance of injustice” (p. 154). Their experiences have 
often instilled in them an extreme sense of cynicism and suspicion of authority, and 
they often display empathy for other victims of injustice. Second, exonerees often 
desire an acknowledgement of error on the part of the government and compensation 
for harms suffered. Paradoxically, although all prisoners must deal with issues relating 
to institutionalization, prior research provides anecdotal evidence that exonerees may 
be afforded less in the way of reentry services than are guilty prisoners upon release, 
including lack of access to halfway houses or drug rehabilitation programs. Indeed, 
reentry programs are often designed specifically for actual offenders and are not avail-
able to those who are actually innocent (Westervelt & Cook, 2010).
Another way to distinguish exonerees from parolees and others released from 
incarceration is to adopt a framework from within which their unique struggles can be 
better understood and the importance of compensation and reentry assistance empha-
sized. One possibility is to adopt the idea of exonerees as victims of state harm. 
Westervelt and Cook (2010) do so, developing six main points in their argument: 
(a) victims tend to be among the least socially powerful actors; (b) victimizers gener-
ally fail to recognize and understand the nature, extent, and harmfulness of institu-
tional policies and, if suffering is acknowledged, it is often neutralized within the 
context of a sense of entitlement; (c) victims are often blamed for their suffering; 
(d) victims must generally rely on the victimizer, an associated institution, or civil 
social movements for redress; (e) victims are easy targets for repeated victimization; 
and (f) illegal state policies and practices are manifestations of the attempt to achieve 
organizational, bureaucratic, or institutional goals.
Though a full examination of these six points is beyond the scope of the current 
article, several of them are appropriate for discussion here. As Westervelt and Cook 
(2010) note, the wrongly convicted tend not to be among the socially powerful, at least 
when it comes to the criminal justice process. It is not uncommon for these cases to 
involve an indigent defendant with an underfunded lawyer matched up against a well-
funded, or at least better funded, prosecutor. The state also controls the media repre-
sentations of the case, which often paint negative constructions of the defendant and 
“legitimate activities of state agents” (p. 261). In addition, the victimizers frequently 
fail to recognize the harmfulness of their actions and, when acknowledged, the suffer-
ing of exonerees is neutralized. It is common for state agents to continue to deny the 
actual innocence of exonerees long after release. Furthermore, state actors, particu-
larly police and prosecutors who engage in harmful behavior that leads to wrongful 
conviction, are rarely held accountable for their actions. It is then these same actors on 
whom the wrongfully convicted must often rely to reinvestigate the case, discover 
previous errors, and retry the case (Westervelt & Cook, 2010).
If a mistake is discovered and remedied, and exoneration does occur, the freed 
individual is often the target of repeated victimization. This is sometimes the direct 
result of the actions taken by state actors, such as when exonerees are subjected to 
post-release police surveillance. More often, however, the failures of the state to acknowl-
edge its mistake and provide meaningful reintegration assistance have indirect 
consequences for exonerees, including lack of access to health care and employment 
(Westervelt & Cook, 2010).
When the state does not provide compensation and reintegration services, it exac-
erbates an already difficult situation facing the wrongly convicted. Exonerees must 
often rely on nonprofit organizations for assistance (Westervelt & Cook, 2010). 
Though helpful, this may do little to alleviate exonerees’ feelings of victimization at 
the hands of the state and their desire for an official acknowledgment of error (Campbell 
& Denov, 2004; Westervelt & Cook, 2010). To address these issues, statewide statu-
tory compensation statutes may be the strongest remedy.
Though such statutes may not fully address every struggle faced by exonerees on 
release, they can go a long way toward easing wrongfully convicted individuals back 
into society, providing some sense of comfort and allowing the wrongly convicted to 
rebuild their lives.
Though there may be several possible viewpoints from which to examine post-
exoneration struggles, the state harms framework is appropriate for several reasons. 
First, by highlighting the role of the state in wrongful convictions, it addresses the 
concerns of many exonerees, who often focus “on the state’s active contribution to 
their feelings of victimization” (Westervelt & Cook, 2010, p. 259). Thus, compensa-
tion and reentry assistance provided by the state may assist exonerees in overcoming 
these feelings and rebuilding their lives. Second, the state harms framework is fairly 
comprehensive, addressing the social status of the wrongly convicted, the organiza-
tional roots of wrongful convictions, post-release victimization, and the difficulties 
inherent in obtaining redress for the harms suffered. Finally, Westervelt and Cook 
(2010) provide an important step in the theoretical development of wrongful convic-
tion scholarship, which can help guide analysis of related policies such as compensa-
tion statutes. Their analysis provides a theoretical foundation on which we can more 
fully develop the study of wrongful convictions, which includes policies designed to 
prevent, discover, and remedy them.
The Current Study
Though previous surveys of compensation statutes have been informative, they have 
typically focused on legal descriptions of particular statutes and qualitative assess-
ments of specific aspects of those policies. They do not shed light on the extent to 
which weaknesses or limitations are found in existing compensation statutes nation-
wide and provide no real indication of how strong or weak each state’s policy is when 
taken as a whole. In this study, I provide a detailed content analysis of existing statutes 
and compare each with the model policy provided by the Innocence Project. Though 
the statutes vary widely and often contain intricacies that are difficult to assess, it is 
important to compare existing legislation against a standard to develop a more com-
plete and objective understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of current policies 
and the changes that must be made to strengthen them.
Method
Content Analysis
State statutes were found online through the Innocence Project and WestLaw 
searches. Information was also gathered from Bernhard (2009) and the New York 
State Bar Association’s Task Force on Wrongful Convictions (2009) report. The stat-
utes were then reliably coded2 across 10 dimensions. A total of 55 variables were 
coded. Descriptive statistics were run across all dimensions, providing a detailed 
breakdown of existing compensation provisions.
Dimension 1: Monetary compensation. First, a dichotomous variable was created to indi-
cate whether jurisdictions provide monetary compensation. If monetary compensation 
Table 1. Monetary and Other Beneficial Provisions
Provision
Number of 
statutes
Percentage of 
existing statutes
Monetary compensation 27 96.4
Per year serveda 15 53.6
Set amount per year 10 35.7
Range per year 2 7.1
Based on state income 2 7.1
Additional money for time on death row 0 0
Additional money for time on parole or sex 
 offender registry
1 3.6
Maximum total compensation limit 14 50.0
Other assistance 16 57.1
Employment assistance/training 5 17.9
Education assistance 8 28.6
Counseling/mental health services 5 17.9
Physical health services 4 14.3
Court costs/fines 5 17.9
Detention facility costs 2 7.1
Child support payments 1 3.6
Reentry/reintegration services 4 14.3
Attorney fees 8 28.6
Lost wages/income 3 10.7
Record expungement 4 14.3
 Immediate 3 10.7
Separate hearing 1 3.6
a. The numbers for monetary compensation per year served add up to 14 rather than 15 due to
the unique wording of the New Jersey statute, which states that exonerees are entitled to yearly 
compensation equal to either twice the claimant’s income in the year prior to conviction or US$20,000, 
whichever is greater.
Table 3. Other Provisions
Provision
Number of 
statutes
Percentage of 
existing statutes
Statute of limitationsa 20 71.4
<3 years 13 46.4
3 years 4 14.3
>3 years 2 7.1
Burden of proof 25 89.3
 Preponderance 8 28.6
Clear and convincing 12 42.9
 DNA 3 10.7
 Other 2 7.1
Award nontaxable 4 14.3b
Civil redress against state 10 35.7
Prohibited or waived 7 25.0
 Permitted 3 10.7
“Upon Death” provision 10 37.0b
Compensation terminated 4 14.8b
Annuity with beneficiary provisions 3 11.1b
Estate/survivors eligible 3 11.1b
Survivors may file claim on behalf of exoneree 2 7.4b
a. The numbers for statute of limitations add up to 20 rather than 21 due to the unique wording of
the Florida statute, which states claimant has only 90 days to petition for determination of status as 
a wrongfully incarcerated person and thus eligible for compensation and then has 2 years to file an 
application.
b. Percentage calculated out of the 27 states that provide monetary compensation (excludes Montana).
Table 2. Eligibility Requirements, Disqualifications, and Limitations
Provision
Number of 
statutes
Percentage of 
existing statutes
Limitation on type of crime 13 46.4
Required pardon 4 14.3
Explicit disqualifications 20 71.4
Prior felony conviction 1 3.6
Subsequent felony conviction 5 17.9
Concurrent sentence 12 42.9
Guilty plea 6 21.4
Contributing to conviction 7 25.0
 Fabricating evidence/suborning or committing  
 perjury
3 10.7
Waived appellate rights 1 3.6
Minimum time served 1 3.6
was available, five additional dichotomous variables were coded, indicative of the fol-
lowing: whether there is a set yearly amount of compensation3; whether the state pro-
vides additional compensation for time on death row; whether there is additional 
compensation for time spent on parole or as a registered sex offender; whether the yearly 
amount is based on state income; and whether there is a total maximum amount of com-
pensation. The amounts provided for by these different statutes were also recorded.
Dimension 2: Other assistance. To assess any other assistance provided by compen-
sation statutes, 11 dichotomous variables were created. The first indicated whether the 
state provides any other assistance, and the remaining variables assessed individual 
types of assistance, including the following: employment assistance/job skills train-
ing; counseling or mental health services; physical care or medical services; child 
support payments; education assistance; other reintegrative or reentry services; remu-
neration for costs or fines imposed at the time of sentence or court costs; detention 
facility fees; attorney fees; and lost wages. Any limits placed on attorney fees and lost 
wages were noted.
It is important to note that several statutes provide for these forms of assistance to be 
included or considered in determining the amount of compensation. States that explicitly 
mention each type of assistance were coded 1 and those that do not were coded 0.
Dimension 3: Record expungement. Statutes were coded to indicate whether they 
provided for immediate record expungement, a separate hearing to address expunge-
ment or contained no provision.
Dimension 4: Eligibility. A dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether 
there is a restriction on the type of crime for which an individual must have been con-
victed to be eligible for compensation. The restriction was then noted. Two additional 
dichotomous variables were created to indicate whether each statute requires a pardon 
to be eligible and if there is a provision for compensation for pretrial incarceration.
Dimension 5: Disqualifications and limitations. As with other assistance, a series of 
dichotomous variables was created to indicate whether an exoneree is disqualified 
from receiving compensation for each of the following: prior felony conviction; con-
current sentence; subsequent felony; contributing to or bringing about conviction; fab-
ricating evidence or committing or suborning perjury; entering a guilty plea; or 
waiving any appellate rights or postconviction remedies. Exceptions to or limitations 
on the above disqualifications were noted. Any minimum on the amount of time that 
must have been served to receive compensation was recorded. Finally, the total num-
ber of explicit disqualifications expressed in each statute was noted.
Several statutes explicitly state that exonerees who have been the subject of a claim 
bill for compensation, or those that have a pending lawsuit for compensation, are not 
included under this statute. These have not been included as disqualifications because 
individuals excluded by these provisions would have already received, or are in the 
process of attempting to obtain, compensation.
Dimension 6: Statute of limitations. A dichotomous variable was created to indicate 
whether there is a stated time limit within which an exoneree must apply for compen-
sation. The limit was noted for those statutes that included such a provision.
Dimension 7: Burden of proof. A variable was created to indicate whether the required 
burden of proof for each statute was preponderance of the evidence, clear and convinc-
ing evidence, DNA evidence, or other.
The provisions for states included under “Other” were noted.
Dimension 8: Tax provision. A dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether 
each statute explicitly excludes the compensation award from taxation. Any limita-
tions on these provisions were recorded.
Dimension 9: Civil redress. Several states allow for civil redress against the state even 
if the exoneree receives compensation under their statutes. A variable was created to 
indicate whether each statute allowed for further civil redress, expressly prohibited 
further civil redress, or contained no provision.
Dimension 10: “Upon Death” provision. Some of the existing statutes include provi-
sions to address a situation in which the exoneree dies prior to receiving compensa-
tion. Each statute was coded to indicate if the exoneree’s heirs or estate are eligible 
for the remaining compensation, if the statute allows for an annuity that may include 
beneficiary provisions, if compensation ends on the exoneree’s death, or if it contained 
no provision.
Comparison to Model Compensation Statute
The Innocence Project offers a model compensation statute that proposes a US$50,000 
per year minimum, with an additional US$50,000 for each year spent on death row, 
and US$25,000 for each year spent on parole, probation, or as a registered sex offender. 
The model also suggests a slew of other assistance, including mental and physical 
health care, educational credits, and compensation for child support payments, among 
others. It states that the monetary award is nontaxable and does not require a pardon 
or particular type of offense to be eligible for compensation (Innocence Project, 2009; 
see Table 4).
To assess the overall quality of states’ statutes, the Innocence Project model was 
coded in the same fashion as the others. Each statute was then compared with this 
model across 34 attributes. If a statute did not have a provision about a certain area for 
which the Innocence Project did, it received a 0; if there was a provision, but it fell 
below the model standard, it received a 1 (e.g., a statute that provides a yearly amount 
of monetary compensation less than the recommended US$50,000 per year); if the 
provision matched the model, it received a 2; and any provisions that exceeded the 
Innocence Project model received a 3. For the dichotomous variables, such as the pres-
ence or absence of specific disqualifications or other forms of assistance, statutes were 
scored either 0 or 2, depending on whether they met the model standard. If a state 
included a provision which the Innocence Project model did not, such as the “Upon 
Death” provisions, they were given one extra point. With this scoring system, a statute 
which matched all of the model standards would receive a score of 60.4 While this 
system is arguably not perfect, it represents, to my knowledge, the first attempt to 
quantitatively assess and rank the quality of existing compensation statutes for the 
wrongly convicted.
Table 4. Comparison to Innocence Project Model Legislation
Model provision
Number of 
existing statutes 
matching model
Percentage of 
existing statutes 
matching model
Percentage of 
all jurisdictions 
meeting model 
standards
Monetary compensation
 US$50k/year minimum 5 17.9 9.8
 US$50k/year on death 
 row
0 0 0
 US$25k/year on parole/ 
 sex offender registry
1 3.6 2.0
  No maximum 13 46.4 25.5
Other assistance
 Employment assistance/ 
 training
5 17.9 9.8
 Education for exoneree 
 and dependents
0 0 0
 Counseling/mental health 
 services
5 17.9 9.8
 Physical health services 4 14.3 7.8
 Court costs/fines 5 17.9 9.8
 Child support payments 1 3.6 2.0
 Reentry/reintegration  
 services
4 14.3 7.8
 Attorney fees 8 28.6 15.7
  Lost wages/income 3 10.7 5.9
Immediate record  
 expungement
3 10.7 5.9
No crime-type restriction 15 53.6 29.4
No required pardon 24 85.7 47.1
Only one disqualification  
 or less
15 53.6 29.4
3-year statute of limitations 
 or longer
6 21.4 11.8
Burden of proof:  
 Preponderance
8 28.6 15.7
Nontaxable 4 14.3 7.8
Civil redress permitted 3 10.7 5.9
Results5
Content of Existing Compensation Statutes (see Tables 1-3)
Dimension 1: Monetary compensation. The first state compensation statute for wrong-
ful convictions was passed in Wisconsin in 1913. As of May 2011, only 27 states and 
the District of Columbia had one in place.6 Of these, 27 (96.4%) provide monetary 
assistance of some sort; only Montana does not. Fifteen of the statutes provide a 
monetary amount based on time served, either per year or per day of incarceration. 
Two of these are based on state income, two provide a range of money per year served, 
and one, New Jersey, provides the larger of either twice the claimant’s income in the 
year prior to conviction or US$20,000. Ten states provide a set yearly amount of mon-
etary compensation, ranging from US$5,000 to US$80,000, with a median of US$45,150. 
States that do not provide monetary compensation based on time served provide a set 
amount for the entirety of the conviction or leave the decision up to the deciding judge 
or committee. No states provide extra money for time served on death row, but one 
state, Texas, offers an additional US$25,000 for time spent on parole or as a registered 
sex offender as the result of the wrongful conviction. Fourteen statutes have a cap on 
the maximum amount of compensation, ranging from US$20,000 to US$2,000,000 
with a median of US$400,000.
Dimension 2: Other assistance. Sixteen statutes (57.1%) explicitly provide some 
form of other assistance. The most common are education assistance and repayment 
for attorney fees, each found in eight states. In Illinois, repayment for attorney fees 
may not exceed 25% of the total award, and Mississippi limits attorney fees to 10% to 
25% of the award, depending on the court proceedings.7 Other forms of assistance 
include employment or vocational assistance (five statutes), counseling or mental 
health services (five statutes), repayment of court costs or fines imposed at the time of 
the sentence (five statutes), physical health or medical services (four statutes), repay-
ment for lost wages or income (three statutes), and repayment for detention facility 
costs (two statutes). The least common form of other assistance is repayment for child 
support payments, which is provided only in Texas. Several states provide for reentry 
or reintegrative services but do not specify the services included.
Dimension 3: Record expungement. Only four states (14.3%) address the expunge-
ment of the exoneree’s criminal record. Three provide immediate expungement, and 
one, Massachusetts, states that a separate hearing will be conducted to address record 
expungement.
Dimension 4: Eligibility. Even with statutes in place, exonerees may be ineligible for 
compensation. Thirteen statutes (46.4%) have a restriction on the type of crime for 
which the exoneree must have been convicted to be eligible. Twelve of these are 
restricted only to felonies, and one is restricted to felonies or aggravated misdemean-
ors. Four statutes (14.3%) require a pardon for eligibility, and only one state, Alabama, 
provides compensation for pretrial incarceration, though it is restricted to cases in 
which there was no conviction and the incarceration lasted at least 2 years.
Dimension 5: Disqualifications and limitations. Twenty statutes (71.4%) have at least 
one stated disqualification, some with as many as five. The most common disqualifi-
cation, found in 12 statutes, is for a situation in which the exoneree is serving a concur-
rent sentence for a crime of which he or she is presumably guilty. One state, Missouri, 
states that this restriction does not include cases in which the concurrent sentence was 
due to a parole violation caused by the wrongful conviction. Five states also disqualify 
exonerees from receiving compensation if they are convicted of felonies subsequent to 
exoneration. Other disqualifications make it difficult or impossible for an exoneree 
who falsely confessed or pleaded guilty to receive compensation. Some are explicit in 
restricting guilty pleas, whereas others are worded to disqualify those who “contrib-
uted to” or “brought about” their convictions or those who “fabricated evidence.” It is 
important to note that a few states, including California and Nebraska, make excep-
tions for involuntary or coerced false admissions, although these require the claimant 
to prove that the statements were indeed involuntary, which can be an onerous burden. 
Other states will make exceptions to the plea disqualification for defendants who made 
Alford pleas8 (Washington, D.C.), pleas that were withdrawn or vacated (Massachu-
setts), or pleas obtained in cases in which a capital offense was charged (Virginia).
Dimension 6: Statute of limitations. Twenty statutes (71.4%) provide a statute of limi-
tations, ranging from 1 to 10 years. Florida’s statute states that the claimant has only 
90 days to petition for determination of status as a wrongfully incarcerated person and 
thus eligible for compensation and then has 2 years to file an application. Of the other 
19 states, the average time limit is 2.6 years (SD = 2.0), which falls under the 3-year 
standard proposed by the Innocence Project.
Dimension 7: Burden of proof. Twenty-five statutes (89.3%) explicitly state the 
required burden of proof, ranging from preponderance of the evidence to exculpatory 
DNA evidence only. The most commonly stated burden of proof is clear and convinc-
ing evidence, present in 12 statutes. Maryland requires the evidence to be “conclu-
sive,” and Ohio’s statute states that once a claimant establishes that they were 
wrongfully convicted (by providing certified copies of the court judgments), he or she 
“shall be irrebuttably presumed to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual.”
Dimension 8: Tax provision. Only 4 of the 27 states that provide monetary compensa-
tion explicitly state that the compensation award is not subject to taxes and/or not to 
be treated as gross income. Two of these statutes do make an exception for the portion 
awarded as attorney fees under this provision, allowing that amount to be taxed.
Dimension 9: Civil redress. Only three states (10.7%) overtly allow further civil 
redress against the state. Seven states prohibit such action, and the remaining 18 do not 
address the issue.
Dimension 10: “Upon Death” provisions. Only 10 states (37.0%, excluding Montana) 
attend to a situation in which the exoneree dies before receiving the full amount of 
compensation. Four maintain either that compensation ends on death or that payment 
cannot be made to anyone other than the pardoned individual. Three allow for an 
annuity that provides beneficiary provisions, and three state that the exoneree’s heirs 
or estate are eligible for compensation. Only two states explicitly allow a claim to be 
filed on behalf of an exoneree who dies before filing for compensation.
Comparison to Innocence Project Model (see Table 4).
None of the existing statutes match the model standard across all dimensions. Only 
four (14.3%) meet the recommended minimum yearly amount of US$50,000, and 
one, Vermont, provides a yearly range of US$30,000 to US$60,000 that may or may 
not meet this standard. Only one state (3.6%), Texas, exceeds the model, providing 
US$80,000 per year of wrongful incarceration. It is important to note that several 
states allow the fact-finder to determine the appropriate amount of compensation for 
unjust conviction, without setting a yearly amount. This system can be either positive 
or negative. On one hand, it may result in awards much greater than the recommended 
US$50,000 per year; on the other, much smaller amounts may be awarded. A system 
based on judicial interpretation leaves much room inconsistency in repaying exoner-
ees for their time lost to wrongful conviction, and I contend that this ambiguity and 
resulting sense of uncertainty is a weak point in many existing statutes.
Texas is the only state which matches the model in providing additional money for 
time served on parole or as a registered sex offender. No state provides additional 
compensation for time spent on death row. In addition, the Innocence Project suggests 
that no maximum cap be placed on the amount of monetary compensation available. 
Thirteen states (46.4%) follow this suggestion; others only allow for a certain total 
amount of compensation, marked either by a certain dollar amount or a certain number 
of years imprisoned for which the exoneree is eligible for compensation. For example, 
the Texas statute places no cap on the amount of compensation an exoneree may receive. 
In contrast to this, Wisconsin law stipulates that exonerees are eligible for compensa-
tion in the amount of US$5,000 per year, but only up to 5 years, making the maximum 
amount of monetary compensation only US$25,000.
No states match the Innocence Project’s model across all forms of other assistance, 
which explicitly mentions eight forms of such help. Texas is the closest to this figure, 
offering six other forms of assistance. Two statutes (7.1%), however, do mention one 
type of other assistance that is not offered by the Innocence Project model: repay-
ment for detention facility costs and fees that were paid by the wrongly convicted 
individual.
Only 12 states (42.9%) match the model standard on both aspects of eligibility, 
including no restriction on crime type and no pardon requirement. Nine states (32.1%) 
meet or exceed the model across all disqualifications or limitations. The Innocence 
Project only has 1 stated disqualification, and 15 statutes (53.6%) mention either 0 or 
1 explicit disqualification.
The model law suggests a 3-year statute of limitations, a standard met by only 4 
statutes (14.3%) and exceeded only by 2 (7.1%). Only eight statutes (28.6%) match 
the burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence, and only four (of 27 with mon-
etary compensation; 14.8%) meet or exceed the no-tax provision; two of these exceed 
this provision by not including a limitation for the amount awarded as attorney’s fees. 
Immediate record expungement is emphasized in the Innocence Project model, and 
only three existing statutes (10.7%) meet this standard. The model also allows further 
civil redress against the state, and only three statutes (10.7%) match this.
The Innocence Project model does not include any provisions for a situation in 
which the exoneree dies before or in the process of receiving compensation. Thus, the 
5 statutes (17.9%) that do not explicitly terminate compensation upon death appear to 
exceed the model standard, as do the 2 statutes (7.4%) that allows a claim to be filed 
on behalf of a deceased exoneree.
Using the scoring system described above to assess and rank the existing compen-
sation statutes, the score for meeting the model standard across all dimensions would 
be a 60. The overall quality of compensation statutes appears to vary widely. As men-
tioned earlier, no statutes meet the model standard. Scores ranged from 18 (Virginia) 
to 43 (Texas), with an average of 28.9 (SD = 5.6). The scores for all statutes are pre-
sented in Table 5.
Table 5. Assessment Scores of Statutes Compared With Model Legislation
Jurisdiction Score Year effective
Texas 43 2009
Connecticut 41 2008
Vermont 38.5a 2007
Louisiana 36 2008
Ohio 33 2010
North Carolina 32 2008
California 31 2010
Illinois 31 2008
Maryland 30 2003
Maine 29 1993
Montana 29 2003
New Hampshire 29 2007
Tennessee 29 2010
Wisconsin 29 1987
Iowa 28 2008
Mississippi 28 2009
West Virginia 28 1987
Utah 27 2008
Alabama 26 2001
Florida 26 2008
Missouri 26 2006
New Jersey 26 1997
New York 26 2007
Massachusetts 24 2004
District of Columbia 23 1981
Nebraska 22 2009
Oklahoma 21 2003
Virginia 18 2010
a. Vermont’s statute offers a range of monetary compensation per year served (US$30,000-US$60,000)
that may or may not match the model standards. Thus, it was given a score of 1.5 for that particular 
provision.
Discussion
Awareness of wrongful convictions has been growing steadily in recent decades. 
Given that compensation statutes provide the strongest method for remunerating 
exonerees (Bernhard, 1999, 2009), the fact that, nearly 100 years after the first com-
pensation statute was passed, only about half of the states have a statute in place may 
seem surprising. However, it is important to note that wrongful convictions have only 
been garnering consistent national attention since the late 1980s, when DNA began 
adding a new level of scientific certainty to the notion of actual innocence. Indeed, it 
appears as though there is a shift toward the adoption of compensation statutes, as the 
number of them has nearly doubled since 2003, when only 16 states had such a policy 
in place (Bernhard, 2004). Still, the variability and ambiguity among the compensa-
tion statutes that do exist is remarkable. A more detailed examination of the statutes 
on the opposite ends of this scale may provide further insight into these disparities.
Texas appears to provide the most complete compensation statute for the wrongly 
convicted. Their statute provides US$80,000 per year of wrongful incarceration, as 
well as an additional US$25,000 for each year spent on parole or as a registered sex 
offender, with no maximum limit. In addition to monetary damages, the state provides 
vocational training and tuition and fees at a state university or college. The compensa-
tion package also includes counseling for 1 year and assistance in obtaining other 
support services and medical care. Texas is also the only state to pay child-support for 
exonerees. The statute also provides any other reentry or reintegrative services that are 
available to parolees or other inmates released on mandatory supervision. Eligibility 
for compensation in Texas is not restricted to certain crime-types and no pardon is 
required. The statute has a 3-year statute of limitations and requires proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
The Texas compensation statute stands in stark contrast to that of Virginia. Under 
Virginia statute, exonerees are entitled to yearly monetary compensation equal to 90% 
of the state’s per capita personal income,9 with a maximum of 20 years. Though the 
monetary compensation is not grossly inadequate, it does not provide any additional 
money for time on death row, parole, or as a registered sex offender, and the only other 
assistance provided is reimbursement for career or technical training up to US$10,000. 
The statute provides no medical or counseling services and is restricted only to felo-
nies. The statute also does not explicitly state a time limit or burden of proof, leaving 
these issues open to judicial interpretation and creating more uncertainty for exoner-
ees. Though not especially strong, this Virginia statute at the same time stands in stark 
contrast to the 23 states that have no compensation statute in place. Comparing this 
statute with the one in Texas, however, provides a clear picture of the vast discrepan-
cies present among existing statutes.
Overall, this analysis suggests that there is much room for improvement in compen-
sating the wrongly convicted. The monetary compensation provided by existing stat-
utes seems, for the most part, inadequate. Though it is impossible to put a dollar value 
on years lost, amounts as low as US$5,000 per year (as provided in Wisconsin) or 
US$20,000 for the entirety of a wrongful conviction regardless of the length of time 
served (as provided in New Hampshire) arguably are insufficient. Interestingly, no 
states provide additional compensation for time spent on death row, although 138 
individuals to date have been exonerated after being sentenced to death (Death Penalty 
Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org), and researchers have acknowl-
edged the severe psychological consequences of facing a court-ordered death 
(Westervelt & Cook, 2010). The unique experiences of wrongfully convicted individu-
als in capital cases have even been recognized at the federal level, where the compen-
sation statute provides an additional US$50,000 for each year spent on death row. In 
addition, the fact that so few statutes explicitly exempt compensation awards from 
taxation may lead to further confusion and uncertainty (Raeder, 2008) and leave the 
door open for further subjective judicial interpretation.
The other forms of assistance provided by current statutes also seem to fall short in 
several key ways. The lack of attention paid to record expungement in existing statutes 
is noteworthy. This issue was discussed by one exoneree, Alan Gell, who expressed 
frustration at having to pay a lawyer to have his record expunged of a crime which he 
did not commit (Westervelt & Cook, 2010). A lingering criminal record may frustrate 
and anger exonerees and can have long-lasting effects on their lives, including restricted 
employment opportunities, limited access to health care and housing, increased social 
stigma and rejection, and feelings of anger or bitterness (Westervelt & Cook, 2010). In 
addition, statutes vary widely on education and employment assistance provided. 
These are critical issues for exonerees, many of whom were imprisoned for the years 
during which they could have been pursuing secondary or further education or build-
ing a career. Indeed, of the first 250 DNA exonerees, 6% were below 18 at the time of 
their conviction, and 21% were below the age of 21. On average, they were 27 years 
old at the time of their wrongful convictions and 42 when exonerated (Innocence 
Project, 2010). Failure to assist these individuals with educational and vocational 
training can interfere with their ability to rebuild their lives, yet many current statutes 
have overlooked the issue.
Restrictions present in current statutes may disallow many exonerees from receiv-
ing reparation. Among the most interesting and common disqualifications are those 
that restrict compensation for individuals who are seen to have contributed to their 
own convictions. In practice, such a disqualification can eliminate exonerees who 
falsely confessed or plead guilty from receiving compensation. This may disallow a 
significant minority of exonerees from obtaining post-release assistance. For example, 
the statute in New York has such a limitation in place, and of the first 27 DNA exon-
erations in the state, 12 cases involved a false confession. This means that approxi-
mately 44% of exonerees may be disqualified from receiving statutory compensation 
due to one stated limitation. Moreover, this phenomenon is not unique to New York; 
approximately one fourth of known wrongful convictions nationally involved some 
type of false admission (Innocence Project, 2010). Given the wealth of psychological 
research explaining the characteristics of interrogations and individuals that may lead 
to false confessions,10 such limitations may disproportionately restrict compensation 
for certain groups of people, such as juveniles or the mentally impaired. The strict time 
limits stated in several statutes also may be difficult for some exonerees to negotiate. 
Exonerees often struggle to find basic necessities on release and may be unable in 
many instances to file for compensation, which requires legal and financial resources, 
within a time limit as short as one year.
Comparing existing compensation statutes to the model proposed by the Innocence 
Project provides important insight into current efforts to assist the wrongly convicted 
in reentering society and rebuilding their lives. None of the existing statutes stand up 
to the standards proposed by the Innocence Project model across all dimensions. The 
scores, however, indicate that some states have fairly strong compensation statutes 
whereas others do not. Texas, Connecticut, and Vermont, for instance, appear to 
provide the most comprehensive assistance packages; however, states such as 
Virginia and Oklahoma appear to be making a weaker effort to compensate exoner-
ees. It is important to recognize that although the factors identified to contribute to 
wrongful convictions (e.g., false admissions, eyewitness misidentifications) are not 
state-specific, whether the wronged person receives compensation and reentry assis-
tance is dependent on jurisdiction. Thus, exonerees in states that provide little or no 
compensation and reintegration assistance may feel as though they are being victim-
ized yet again by the legal system, further exacerbating the harms suffered at the 
hands of the state.
There is reason to be optimistic, however. Only in recent years has research focused 
on the post-release struggles of exonerees and the importance of compensation. The 
model legislation proposed by the Innocence Project, for example, was only recently 
developed. Thus, there is reason to believe that as more wrongful convictions are dis-
covered, and research on the post-release experiences of exonerees continues to grow, 
states may begin to develop improved policies to provide meaningful reentry assis-
tance for wrongly convicted individuals.
Limitations and Future Research
Though informative, the results of this analysis should be regarded with some level of 
caution due to several limitations. First, this analysis applies equal weight to all aspects 
of compensation statutes. For example, monetary compensation is not regarded as 
being any more or less important than other aspects of compensation statutes, such as 
record expungement or eligibility restrictions. Although certain aspects of compensa-
tion may in fact be more important than others, it seems that any weighting of particu-
lar provisions by persons other than exonerees themselves would be fairly arbitrary. In 
the future, researchers may work with exonerees themselves to determine what aspects 
of compensation packages are most important and develop a weighting system based 
on the needs and desires of those who are directly affected by such policies.
Second, this research does not speak to the practical utilization of existing policies. 
If a state has a broad compensation statute in place, but denies the claims of a majority 
of exonerees, then it may not be accurate to conclude that that state is doing a better 
job of addressing wrongful convictions than a state with a weaker policy. Future 
research can examine the compensation claims of exonerees to determine how many 
are actually made, the proportions that are granted or denied, and the reasons for such 
decisions. Studies of this sort may provide greater insight into the strengths and weak-
nesses of compensation statutes and allow for a stronger assessment of state efforts to 
assist the wrongly convicted after exoneration.
Finally, this analysis has used the model legislation provided by the Innocence 
Project as the standard against which to compare existing statutes. This model, how-
ever, is not the only one that may be used, and it may not represent the gold standard. 
However, using their model legislation seems appropriate for several reasons. First, 
the Innocence Project is the largest and arguably most influential organization dedi-
cated to wrongful convictions and regularly works with exonerees themselves in their 
reentry to society. The model they provide also seems like a viable policy rather than 
an unrealistic ideal. Still, future analyses may compare different models and use these 
policies to assess existing statutes, focusing on any differences in the results.
More generally, research should continue to analyze policies relating to wrongful 
convictions beyond compensation statutes. Several states have responded to issues 
surrounding actual innocence and have begun implementing policies to address them. 
For example, several jurisdictions have enacted reforms to increase the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications and reduce the likelihood of obtaining false confessions 
(see generally, Norris, Bonventre, Redlich, & Acker, 2011). The nature and effective-
ness of these policies should be analyzed closely and systematically. Research of this 
sort can be helpful in developing a more complete understanding of wrongful convic-
tions, including the types of reforms that can address them and move the discussion 
toward a more theoretical understanding of criminal justice as it relates to actual inno-
cence. Indeed, Zalman (2006) argues that criminal justice scholars need to begin 
examining wrongful convictions as a policy issue.
In this context, this article should be viewed as a first step toward building a theo-
retical understanding of wrongful conviction policy. Its purpose has been to highlight 
the variation that exists among compensation statutes for the wrongly convicted; the 
next step is to understand the source of such variation. Are such policies simply reac-
tions to large numbers of exonerations? Is the development of compensation statutes 
and other wrongful conviction policies a partisan political issue? Do structural and 
cultural characteristics of jurisdictions affect the passage of such laws? What is the 
role of the media in the development of wrongful conviction policy? These questions 
and others must be addressed by scholars in the future if we are to fully understand the 
issue of wrongful conviction.
A starting point may be to draw on the “punitive turn” scholarship (see Garland, 
2001). Many scholars of public policy, criminal justice, sociology, and political sci-
ence have attempted to explain why certain states apply punishment differently than 
others and why governments have adopted more punitive criminal justice policies 
over the past several decades (e.g., Beckett & Sasson, 2004; Castellano & McGarrell, 
1991; Jacobs & Helms, 1996; Simon, 2007). Yet these scholars have, for the most 
part, neglected policies on the other end of the spectrum, those designed to achieve 
justice or protect the due process rights of defendants.11 Researchers may draw on this 
vast body of literature to begin developing underlying explanations and theories for 
how and why states respond to wrongful convictions. This line of research may con-
tribute significantly to actual innocence scholarship, an area that has been described 
as “theoretically impoverished” (Leo, 2005, p. 213). Though the results presented in 
this study are largely descriptive, they are a crucial first step toward developing theo-
retical explanations for the processes involved in forming wrongful conviction 
policies.
Conclusion
Individuals who are victims of state harm are deserving of governmental assistance in 
making their recovery, and the wrongly convicted can fit into this category. This study 
has described and assessed states’ statutory efforts to provide such assistance. Results 
show that just more than half of American jurisdictions currently have compensation 
statutes in place and no uniform template exists for such policies. The statutes vary 
widely across many dimensions, including monetary and other assistance, limitations, 
and disqualifications. Some states provide fairly comprehensive compensation stat-
utes, whereas others provide little or no support. Although having a compensation 
statute is certainly better than not, the mere fact that one is in place does not ensure 
that the wrongly convicted, who have often suffered in almost-unimaginable ways and 
had their lives forever altered by the failings of our criminal justice system, are receiv-
ing adequate assistance.
The results presented here help us understand the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing compensation statutes, providing an evaluation that may help lawmakers in 
developing new policies or reforming existing ones. Furthermore, this study helps lay 
a foundation for future scholars to develop a theoretical understanding of the develop-
ment of compensation statutes and, more generally, how and why states are reacting to 
wrongful convictions as they are.
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Notes
1. For example, several states have now implemented reforms improving their eyewitness
identification procedures and interrogation practices, providing DNA oversight, and alter-
ing the use of jailhouse informants or snitches, among others. For a more complete discus-
sion, see Norris, Bonventre, Redlich, and Acker (2011).
2. To establish intercoder reliability, I enlisted the help of two graduate students. After
instructing each about the project and the coding system, approximately one third of the
statutes were randomly selected to be coded by the assistants. Agreement between coders
ranged from 83.6% to 100%. All discrepancies were discussed and a consensus reached.
3. Some states provided for a set amount of compensation for each day served in prison.
I multiplied these figures by 365 and categorized them along with the statutes that provide
for set yearly amounts.
4. The Innocence Project model contained 30 attributes that were coded here. The remaining
4 were beneficial provisions contained in at least 1 state statute for which the model did not
have a provision. Thus, receiving 2 points for matching all model provisions would yield a
score of 60 (30 provisions × 2 points each).
5. Statutes current as of May 2011.
6. The Federal government also has an exoneration-compensation statute, but this study
focused exclusively on individual states.
7. Mississippi’s policy provides for attorney’s fees up to 10% of award if a compensation
claim is prepared and filed; 20% for litigating if claim is contested by the Attorney General; 
and 25% if claim is appealed.
8. Alford pleas allow defendants to simultaneously plead guilty and claim innocence because
they do not wish to take the risk associated with going to trial (North Carolina v. Alford,
1970).
9. According to the official website of the state, Virginia’s per capita personal income in 2009
was US$43,874. This means that an exoneree would be entitled to US$39,486.60 per year
of incarceration, with a maximum cap of US$789,732. See http://vaperforms.virginia.gov/
indicators/economy/personalIncome.php
10. See generally, Kassin et al. (2010). The authors discuss how situational characteristics of
the interrogation itself (e.g., length of interrogation) and dispositional characteristics of the
suspect (e.g., mental illness) may increase the likelihood of obtaining a false confession.
11. An exception to this is Davies and Worden (2009), who examine several aspects of indigent 
defense funding at the state level.
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